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Mullen (2004,2005) conducted an impact assessment of two ACIAR funded economics 
research projects enquiring into domestic grain market reform in China. The benefit cost 
ratio to ACIAR was estimated to be in the range 5:1 to 33:1. The impact assessment was 
conducted when grain policy was viewed as being in a period of retrenchment rather than 
reform and hence the assessment was ex ante in nature. Since then the methodology for 
estimating nominal rates of assistance in China has been modified and the late 90s is now 
seen as a period when reform continued despite the professed policy stance. It seems 
opportune to revisit Mullen’s original impact assessment to assess the extent of welfare 
gains actually achieved.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Mullen (2004, 2005) reported an ex ante assessment of the likely welfare gains from 
grain market reform in China that could be attributed to the influence of two 
economics research  projects funded by the Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research (ACIAR). The projects spanned the period 1993 to 2003 and 
the focus was on rice, wheat, maize and soybean, accounting for a large share of crop 
production in China.  
 
Market reform in China began with decollectivisation in the late 70s but periods of 
policy reform have been followed by periods of retrenchment. The late 90s were 
regarded as a period of retrenchment. Although China was once again experimenting 
with market reform in the early part of this century, other than through capacity 
building, benefits from the ACIAR projects still seemed prospective rather than 
realised in 2004 when Mullen undertook an impact assessment.  
 
There are two reasons for revisiting Mullen’s original impact assessment. First, to 
assess whether the welfare gains from the ACIAR projects, anticipated in Mullen 
(2004, 2005), were realised. Second, there has been a significant change in the way 
market intervention in Chinese agriculture has been measured (Huang, Rozelle, 
Martin and Yu, 2008) such that the reform scenario on which Mullen’s analysis was 
based is no longer credible and the impact assessment needs to be redone if ACIAR is 
to use it in meeting its accountability requirements.  
2.  ACIAR’s Grain Marketing Policy Projects in China 
 
The objective of Mullen (2004,2005) was to undertake an economic analysis of the 
ACIAR-funded projects ADP/1992/028 “Emergence and integration of regional grain 
markets in China”  (undertaken from 1993 to 1997) and ADP/1997/021 “Chinese 
grain market policy with special emphasis on the domestic grain trade” (1999 to 
2003). In general terms both projects aimed to encourage a continuation of a process  
of market reform by demonstrating  the likely inefficiencies associated with 
government intervention in grain marketing in China using empirical measures of 
comparative advantage, market integration and household income (from project 
surveys) to support a traditional analytical framework related to free markets.  
 
The process of grain market reform in China has been influenced on the one hand by a 
range of internal and external research and policy institutions, of which the ACIAR-
funded projects are only a small part, and on the other, by a range of issues such as 
food security, income distribution and WTO, of which grain market efficiency is but 
one. Perhaps concerns about food security and potential social unrest have been 
paramount concerns. The challenge is to isolate the ACIAR-funded projects’ 
contribution from these other influences on grain market reform in China (Pardey and 
Smith (2004)).   
 A key objective of the ACIAR impact assessment process is to estimate the rate of 
return earned from ACIAR’s investment. This objective was pursued in Mullen’s 
original impact assessment and again below. However there is considerable 
uncertainty surrounding these estimates attached to both total welfare gains and the 
attribution of a share of these gains to ACIAR. Hence an important feature of the 
assessment process was to identify outputs and outcomes from the projects which 
were not valued and pathways to adoption or influence that supported the case that the 
projects were likely to have been welfare enhancing. These contributions of the 
project were carefully reviewed in Mullen (2004). In brief, key arguments for the 
success of the projects have been the strength of the Chinese partners and capacity 
building within the Department of Policy Reform and Law in the MOA. These claims 
were difficult to verify but were not disputed in interview processes.  Earlier reviews 
of the projects commissioned by ACIAR commented on these issues and concluded 
that the projects were likely to influence grain marketing policy in China (Carter and 
Cai, 2001). 
 
The communications record of both projects is impressive and project partners have 
been able to build on the success of the projects in terms of continued funding and 
professional recognition.  
3.  2004 Ex Ante Impact Assessment 
3.1  Findings 
 
Measures of the direction and extent of government intervention in grain markets in 
China, the basis of estimated welfare gains from market reform, have been revised 
and are discussed in more detail in the next section. However at the time of Mullen’s 
original assessment it appeared that in the late 90s the extent of intervention in grain 
marketing by the Chinese government increased rather than decreased. In quantifying 
(ex ante) potential benefits, Mullen judged that the projects were likely to have 
advanced the time by which the Chinese government returned to a process of policy 
reform that was evident until the late 90s. He estimated, using a methodology 
described below, that the annual welfare gains to China from a return to this reform 
process was likely to be in the order of 1,500 m yuan per year. This represented  the 
difference in losses to China between the situation of the late 90s when the welfare 
costs of intervention were about 0.5 percent of the value of grain production and the 
situation prior to that when welfare costs had been about 0.2 percent of the value of 
grain production. It was anticipated that without the ACIAR projects this lower level 
of intervention would have been attained by 2004 when China joined the WTO. 
 
There are many sources of economics research and policy advice to the Chinese 
government. One scenario analysed by Mullen (2004, 2005) was where economics 
research ( including the ACIAR projects) brought forward policy reform from the end 
of 2004 by between 3 and 6 months. For this scenario, the present value of benefits 
was estimated to be between $40.3m and $88.6m.  Assuming that cost of this total 
body of research was around $13.5m, the benefit-cost ratio was in the range of 3:1 to 
6.6:1. On their own, Mullen assessed that the ACIAR-funded projects were likely to 
advance the pace of reform less than the total body of economics research. If the 
ACIAR-funded projects alone brought forward policy reform from the end of 2004 by 
1 month, given the cost of the ACIAR-funded research was approximately $2.7m, then the present value of the investment was $12.7m and the benefit-cost ratio for the 
ACIAR-funded projects was 4.7:1, a satisfactory return on funds invested. 
 
Mullen estimated that since 1994 real expenditure (2002 dollars) by ACIAR on these 
projects, including in-kind contributions from partners, has amounted to about $2.7m. 
Other scenarios are described in Mullen (2004).  
3.2  Methodology for Welfare Analysis 
In very general terms the efficiency gains from grain market reform can be thought of 
as reducing the social costs (or deadweight loss) associated with a price wedge in the 
form of a tax or a subsidy caused by government intervention in the market. Mullen 
(2004, 2005) followed a procedure developed by Alston and James (2002) to estimate 
these deadweight losses.  
  
The impact of removing a grain subsidy of say, τ (% of final price) is to reduce the 
price to farmers from P1 to P0 in Figure 1 with an accompanying decrease in domestic 
production from Q1 to Q0. Producer surplus decreases by the area A + B. Consumer 
surplus (if grain under intervention had been sold at price P2 to avoid stockpiles) 
decreases by area C + D. The gain to government is the area A + B + C + D + E and 
hence the deadweight loss, the net welfare gain to China, is the area E.  Similarly in 
the case of removing a tax, the net welfare gain to China, is the area E (Mullen 2004).  
 
The extent of the deadweight loss for the removal of a subsidy can be estimated using 
linear approximations of supply and demand from the following formula adapted 
from Alston and James: 
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where τP1 is the reduction in farm price, ε is the supply elasticity, and η is the absolute 
value of the demand elasticity at equilibrium.  The social gain from the policy, 
increases with the size of the industry (PQ), and the size of the price wedge associated 
with that change (and varies with market parameters). Hence the DWL can vary with 
production and price irrespective of the price wedge. 
  




4.  Grain Market Intervention Since the 2004 Impact Assessment Report 
 
Mullen (2004) briefly reviewed the recent history of grain market intervention in 
China but more authoritative reviews can be found in Findlay and Chen (1999), 
Watson and Findlay (1999), Zhong (2001) and most recently in Huang, Rozelle, 
Martin and Yu (2008). There is also a parallel literature presenting empirical 
estimates of the extent of intervention. Estimates from Huang, Rozelle and Chang 
(2004) and Huang, Rozelle, Martin and Yu (2008) were relied on in the original 
assessment and again here.  
 
It is important to at least briefly review some of the literature on grain market reform 
because Mullen’s 2004 impact assessment supported by reviews of policy and 
empirical analysis of levels of assistance, was based on a scenario of policy 
retrenchment in the late 90s, the so-called ‘governor’s grain responsibility (1994)’ and 
the ‘three policies and one reform (1998)’ programs. This view of a period of 
retrenchment in the late 90s seemed to be supported by empirical measures of  
assistance to grain farmers from Huang, Rozelle and Chang (2004) although some 
papers arising from the ACIAR projects raised doubts about the efficacy of these two 
interventionist programs. Household surveys  by Zhou and Zhong (2001) and by  
Huang Yanxin (2001) found that the 1998 ‘three policies and one reform’ package 
had been largely ineffective in achieving its goals.   
Later reviews such as that by Huang et al. (2008) barely mention these programs and 
present empirical evidence more consistent with an ongoing process of reform rather 
than a cycle of reform and retrenchment.  
 
The extent to which farm commodities have been taxed or protected in China has 
generated a large literature with divergent views. Differences in methodology arose 
with respect to the treatment of exchange rate movements and of taxes at the border 
and domestically. The notion of and procedures for representing government 
intervention in a commodity by one number given the scope of the market for 
significant grains in China is also a source of difference. 
4.1  NRAs Used in the Mullen (2004) Report 
 
Mullen (2004) used estimates from Huang, Rozelle and Chang (2004) which are 
displayed in Table 1 below. Weighting these nominal assistance rates (NRA) by the 
value shares of the four grains, Mullen derived an average rate of assistance for the 
four grains over the period 19980 to 2001 which is detailed in Table 2 and Figure 2 
below.  
 
This average rate of assistance through time was used to estimate the  deadweight 
losses associated with government intervention in these four grain markets using the 
methodology described above from Alston and James (2002). The deadweight losses 
were expressed relative to the farm value of production of these grains to give some 
indication of the trend in the overall impact of government intervention in the 
markets.  The deadweight losses and the deadweight losses relative to the value of 
production over the period 1981 to 2001 are displayed in Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4.  
  
Table 1.  Changes in Nominal Rates of Protection Over Time of  
China’s Major Agricultural Commodities, 1978 to 2000.
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  10  89  92  40 
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  9  58  46  44 
1985-89 
 
  -4  52  37  39 
1990-94 
 
  -7  30  12  26 
1995-97 
 
  -1  19  20  19 
1998-00    -6  26  32  49 
   1998    -6  22  40  37 
   1999    -9  30  33  67 
   2000 
2001 










a Nominal rates of protection (NPRs) measured as difference (in  
percentage terms) between average border price and average  
domestic wholesale (market) price. 
 
Source:  Huang, Jikun, Scott Rozelle and Min Chang (2004), "Tracking the Nature of Distortions to 














1980  0.31 948                    75,044              0.013
1981  0.31 1,008               76,857              0.013
1982  0.31 1,102               84,420              0.013
1983  0.32 1,273               92,594              0.014
1984  0.32 1,767               129,243            0.014
1985  0.22 1,335               131,304            0.010
1986  0.23 1,552               148,334            0.010
1987  0.21 1,479               157,610            0.009
1988  0.21 1,970               208,536            0.009
1989  0.20 2,456               261,797            0.009
1990  0.08 698                    236,771            0.003
1991  0.08 650                    222,071            0.003
1992  0.09 780                    247,863            0.003
1993  0.09 1,043               347,637            0.003
1994  0.08 1,691               608,270           0.003
1995  0.10 1,347               743,243            0.002
1996  0.10 1,325               728,064            0.002
1997  0.10 1,148               622,347            0.002
1998  0.15 3,131               578,855           0.005
1999  0.15 3,486               490,832            0.007
2000  0.13 1,622               420,685            0.004




















These series provide support to the view that there was a period of policy 
retrenchment from the mid 90s.  The deadweight losses during this period of policy 
retrenchment, heuristically associated with the area under  inverted U section of the 
graph from 1997 to 2001 in Figure 2, were used by Mullen as the basis for estimating 
the gains from returning to a policy regime where deadweight losses were again about 
0.2% of the value of production of the grains partly as a result of the influence of the 
ACIAR funded grain market intervention research.  
4.2  Estimates of NRAs from Huang, Rozelle, Martin and Yu (2008) 
 
Figures 2-4 also display revised NRAs from Huang, Rozelle, Martin and Yu (2008) 
and the deadweight losses based on them for the period 1981- 2005. The average 
NRA was again derived by weighting the NRA for each of the four grains by its share 
in total value. There are obvious marked differences from the earlier series. 













Figure 4: Deadweight loss in Chinese Grain Markets Relative to Gross value of 














 The difference is seen most starkly in Figure 2. The average nominal rate of 
assistance used in the earlier Mullen (2004) suggested that on average the four grains 
were protected throughout the entire period to 2001 with the average declining from 
about 30% in 1981 to less than 10% in the early 90s before rising again in the period 
of retrenchment. In contrast the revised estimates from Huang et al (2008) suggest 
that on average the grain crops were taxed until the early 90s
1. Since then the paths of 
the two estimates have been similar but far from coincident with each other.  
 
There are deadweight losses associated with both protection and taxation and hence 
the fundamental difference between the two series is less evident in Figures 3 and 4 
expressed in deadweight loss terms. Nevertheless the time path and size in some years 
of deadweight losses between the two series are significantly different. In deriving 
these estimates of deadweight losses, the same values for demand and supply 
elasticities have been used as in Mullen (2004, 2005) which came from Huang and 
Chen (1999).  
 
Furthermore, and perhaps of greater consequence for this revision of the earlier 
impact assessment, there is little evidence from this new series of a period of policy 
retrenchment in the late 90s, the costs of which were a key element in estimating the 
benefits from the ACIAR and other policy research conducted from the mid 90s.  
4.3  Differences Between the NRA Series 
 
The key differences between the two series (Huang pers. comm.) are that in Huang, 
Rozelle, Martin and Yu (2008): 
 
•  NRAs are estimated at the farm level rather than just at the border; 
•  Prior to 1995 wholesale prices were unavailable and the two series are based 
on different processes to derive domestic prices in these earlier years; 
•  Exchange rates for both exports and imports have been used rather than a 
single official exchange rate; 
•  Further adjustments for differences in quality in commodities have been made. 
  
The processes used by Huang et al. (2008) are described in Anderson, Martin, Sandri 
and Valenzuela (2007). 
 
It is still somewhat puzzling that while concerns were emerging about the 
ineffectiveness of the policy retrenchment in the late 90s,  noting that farmers and 
private grain traders could circumvent to some degree the intended policy settings, 
suggesting that the real incidence of policy settings was less than nominal rates,  the 
period was still generally regarded as a time of retrenchment and the estimates of 
assistance supported this. Perhaps the earlier estimates of assistance were unduly 
influenced by ‘official’ prices and hence did not adequately reflect market conditions 
in the way later estimates do.  
 
                                                
1 Graphs for individual grains can be found in an appendix to this paper. 
 5.  Welfare Analysis of the ACIAR Projects Revisited 
 
Has Mullen’s original ex ante impact assessment of the ACIAR projects stood the test 
of time?  
 
At a very superficial level one could note that the rate of market liberalisation 
projected in the original assessment did eventuate and in fact was exceeded. Hence 
the return to the ACIAR investment is at least as large as that anticipated and there is 
no need to revisit the original impact assessment.  However, in view of changes both 
in estimates of NRAs to grain in China and in perceptions about the market reform 
process, Mullen’s is no longer a credible assessment of what has actually occurred 
and hence ACIAR could not in good faith use Mullen’s estimated rate of return in 
accounting for its use of public funds. 
 
Even in an ex post situation the problems of attributing gains to the ACIAR project 
from market reform in China are formidable. They are not fully resolved here and 
remain the subject of ongoing research.  Only one scenario is presented in this paper. 
 
The ACIAR supported projects began in 1994. Without making any attribution at this 
stage, the figures above suggest that the mid 90s were a time when the policy regime 
changed significantly. In this year according to the revised estimates by Huang et al. 
(2008) of average NRA (Figure 2), government intervention in the four grains 
industries switched from a stance of taxing these industries at a heavy rate to a stance 
of moderately protecting them. Actual deadweight losses from government 
intervention remained high in the mid 90s but this was largely because these were 
years of high grain production (in value terms) (Figure 3). Relative to GVP however, 
deadweight losses returned to 0.5% and, except for 2005 declined from then until 
1999 and have remained at about 0.10% since then (Fig. 4). The deadweight losses for 
the four grains (at a discount rate of 5%) from 1994 to 2003 were estimated to be 
20.9b yuan.   This is the ‘with policy research’ scenario, although the contribution of 
policy research in general and the ACIAR projects in particular is most uncertain. 
 
The ‘without policy research’ scenario is unknown. One scenario is that the level of 
market intervention would have remained at the  rate achieved in 1994 such that the 
deadweight losses of intervention were 0.5%. The deadweight losses associated with 
this scenario are much larger – 31.2b yuan to 2003, a difference of 10.3b yuan. 
 
As Mullen (2004) found there was a high likelihood that the process of market reform 
in China would have continued irrespective of any program of economics policy 
research partly motivated by the prospect of accession to the WTO on 2004 but 
largely through its own ‘learning’ experiences.  
 
Hence another still naïve scenario is to assume that the rate of market intervention 
declined linearly from the level in 1994 (0.49%) to that in 2003. The present value in 
2001 yuan of the stream of deadweight losses from 1994 to 2003 associated with this 
scenario was 22.1 b yuan, a difference of 1.2b yuan relative to the actual path of 
market reform.  
 
From Mullen (2004) the investment in grain policy research in China was 
$A(2001)2.4m. If we make the unreasonable assumption that the ACIAR investment delivered all of the gains of 1.2b yuan then the benefit cost ratio is 122:1 (at an 
exchange rate in 2001 of $A1=4.2 yuan). 
 
Mullen (2004) examined a number of alternative attribution scenarios. In one 
scenario, the total investment across all agencies in policy research was assessed to 
have been 5 times the investment by ACIAR. Under this scenario the benefit cost 
ratio in this revised assessment is 24:1. 
 
Another scenario is one in which the ACIAR projects are credited with advancing the 
pace of reform by one year. This scenario has been modelled as adjusting the 
‘without’ scenario such that the 2003 nominal rate of assistance is reached in 2002 (8 
years instead of 9 years). The gains attributed to the ACIAR projects are the 
difference in DWL of the 8 year ‘without’ scenario and the 9 year ‘without’ scenario. 
These benefits amount to 0.9b yuan (2001) and give a BCR to ACIAR’s investment 
of 10:1. 
 
Other reform scenarios will be considered in future research. 
6.  Conclusions  
 
Mullen (2004) conducted an ex ante assessment of the impact of two ACIAR funded 
economics research projects which started in 1994 dealing with domestic grain market 
reform in China. At the time of this impact assessment policy reviews and empirical 
measures of assistance to agriculture suggested that the late 90s were a period of 
policy retrenchment rather than reform and hence the welfare gains from this program 
of research identified by Mullen were prospective in nature rather than realised. In 
addition the difficulties of attributing a portion of the total prospective welfare gains 
from market reform to the ACIAR projects were severe. Mullen estimated that for a 
scenario in which the deadweight losses from government intervention in grain 
markets returned to a level of 0.2% of the value of production of rice, wheat, corn and 
soybean, the returns to the total research and policy development might be in the 
range of 3:1 to 6.6:1 were the pace of reform advanced by 3 to 6 months and the 
returns to ACIAR’s investment might come to 4.7:1 were its contribution to advance 
reform by one month. 
 
The credibility of the Mullen assessment is now somewhat diminished. Estimates of 
nominal rates of assistance to agriculture in China have been substantially revised by 
Huang et al. (2008) and it would seem that while the stance of policy in the late 90s 
might have appeared interventionist, the actual experience in the markets was one of a 
continuing reform process.   
 
Mullen’s 2004 assessment has been revisited here. Further research remains to 
identify alternative plausible scenarios for the path of reform in the absence of the 
ACIAR projects. The initial scenario examined here is where the value of deadweight 
losses from market intervention (as a proportion of the value of production of the four 
grains) is projected as likely to have increased by 1.2 b yuan. If all these gains are 
attributed to the ACIAR investment of $2.4m (2001) then the benefit cost ratio is 
122:1. Were total investment in policy research in the order of five times the ACIAR 
investment then the BCR declines to 24:1. In a scenario in which the ACIAR projects are credited with advancing the pace of reform by one year the BCR to the ACIAR 
investment might be in the order of 10:1.  
 
These revised estimates of the return to investment in economics research into grain 
market reform in China in general and to the ACIAR projects in particular are 
somewhat higher than the original estimates, as might be expected given the faster 
rate of reform. The chief attraction is that this analysis is ex post rather than ex ante in 
nature and is consistent with recent views about the nature and extent of reform in the 
marketing of grains in China.  
 
The focus here has been on revisiting the Mullen’s (2004) financial analysis of the 
ACIAR projects. His original discussion of other measures of success of the projects 
still stand. The projects were highly likely to have been successful because of 
authority of the Chinese collaborators, the capacity building within Chinese 
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